Aircraft Survivability Newsletter List
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LTC John N. Lawless, Jr.
Naval Air Systems Command
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This issue of Aircraft Survivability focuses on directed energy weapons (DEW). Once the exclusive domain of science fiction writers, the threat posed by DEW, especially to modern combat aircraft, has increased exponentially in recent years. Advances in the miniaturization of components and the efficiency of power supplies, together with our ever-increasing dependency on sophisticated yet fragile electro-optical sensors, have led to some formidable challenges for the aircraft survivability community. Although we have made tremendous progress against some of the more "traditional" threats, we must continue to anticipate the weapons we may face on the future battlefield and prepare to counter them now.
I am happy to announce the arrival in the Central Office of Major Richard P. "Dick" Lockwood, our new Air Force military representative. Dick just completed an assignment at Scott AFB, Illinois, where he was the Air Mobility Command (AMC) manager for the aircraft structural integrity and aircraft battle damage repair programs. He also has a background in electronic warfare (EW), which will prove valuable as our communities grow ever more closely interconnected. Welcome, Dick, and we look forward to working with you.
We have been extremely gratified by the feedback we have received on our June 1995 symposium, Challenges in Air Combat Survivability: The Next 25 Years. Many of the nearly 300 participants considered it to be one of the best such professional gatherings they have attended, which is a tribute to the dedication and hard work of the many individuals who made it all come together. Our symposium critique forms contained several constructive recommendations as well, and these will prove to be very valuable as we plan for our next conference. Once again, thanks to the many speakers, session chairs, support personnel, and attendees who helped make our symposium such a success.
The last few months have been busy ones for the JTCG/AS leadership. During the first week of August, our three principal members, together with our subgroup chairs and cochairs, OSD sponsors, and Central Office staff, participated in an intensive 3-day conference in Warrenton, Virginia. Although its primary purpose was to develop the Fiscal Year 1996 Program Plan for the JTCG/AS, the meeting also gave participants the opportunity to critically examine and prioritize the many challenges faced by the aircraft survivability community. In September, the Principal Member Steering Group (PMSG) met at Arnold Air Force Base, Tennessee, to formally approve the FY96 Plan and to discuss numerous recent developments in the survivability discipline. The PMSG will meet informally in November to further refine the Order of Merit development process for FY97.
Finally, it is with deep regret that I note the passing of Mr. Mel Keith of the Naval Air Warfare Center at China Lake, California. Mr. Keith, a founding member of the JTCG/ME, made countless significant contributions to the vulnerability community during his more than 30 years of service. He will be sorely missed, yet fondly remembered by his many friends and colleagues.
John N. Lawless, Jr.
The newest arrival at the Central Office is Major Richard P. (Dick) Lockwood. Maj Lockwood, an Air Force navigator, electronic warfare officer, and aeronautical engineer, comes to us from Headquarters, Air Mobility Command (AMC), Scott AFB, Illinois. Since 1991, he had been the AMC manager for the aircraft structural integrity and aircraft battle damage repair (ABDR) programs. He has directed electronic countermeasures operational tests and evaluations at the 4484th Test Squadron, Tyndall AFB, Florida. Maj Lockwood deployed to Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm as a C-130 ABDR engineer while assigned to the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Robins AFB, Georgia.
Maj Lockwood earned a B.S. in aerospace engineering from the University of Maryland and is a 1980 ROTC distinguished graduate. Before entering active duty, he operated and maintained target tracking radars at the Chesapeake Test Range, Patuxent River Naval Air Test Center, Maryland. He is a 1981 distinguished graduate of USAF navigator training. Maj. Lockwood received the Wright Laboratory Aeronautical Award upon completion of electronic warfare training in 1982. In 1987, he earned an M.S. in aeronautical engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology. He completed Air Force Air Command and Staff College in 1994. He and his wife Paige just celebrated their son Nolan's first birthday.
Dr. Frank R. Barone, Navy co-chairman of the JTCG/AS Susceptibility Reduction Subgroup, was recently presen-ted the Bill Goodell Memorial Award for Distinguished Service by the IRIS Specialty Group on Infrared Countermeasures (IRCM). This award, which was presented at the IRCM meeting in April, recognizes Dr. Barone's outstanding contributions to the IRIS IRCM Specialty Group and his long and dedicated service to the IRCM community.
Dr. Barone has been actively involved in IRCM since 1979. He has authored 23 papers at IRCM symposia and published more than 30 IRCM-related technical reports. Dr. Barone served as chair of the IRIS IRCM program committee from 1991 to 1993 and as vice-chair from 1988 to 1990. He has also served on several tri-service working groups dealing with IRCM, including serving as the Navy's principal member on the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) Tri-Service Working Group, which is responsible for all countermeasure laser development.
For the past 10 years, Dr. Barone has led development and testing of IRCM to defeat missile threats to U.S. aircraft. His efforts led to the discovery of a critical susceptibility for an entire class of foreign missiles, which allowed development of low-power jammers for high signature aircraft. Dr. Barone was the first to demonstrate the effect of optical scatter on IRCM susceptibility of missile trackers, and he was also the first to demonstrate the effects of laser-based jamming on an imaging seeker. The success of his work has led to a major effort on imaging seeker IRCM development. Our congratulations to Dr. Barone on this richly deserved honor.
During the Vulnerability Reduction Subgroup meeting with industry in San Diego, Mr. Tom Hess of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminster, PA, was recognized for his long and distinguished service as the Structures and Materials Committee chairman. After having served from February 1986 to March 1995, Mr. Hess recently turned over the chairmanship to Mr. Bill Baron of Wright Laboratory. Mr. Hess will continue as the Navy co-chair for the committee.
It is with great sadness that we announce that Mr. Mel Keith of the Naval Air Warfare Center at China Lake, California, passed away suddenly on September 11, 1995. Mr. Keith was one of the founding member participants when the Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME) was formed in 1965, and he served as Chairman of the JTCG/ME Surface Target Vulnerability Group (STVG) from 1967 through 1994. He was instrumental in the development of many of the vulnerability methodologies and models that have become standards for both the surface and aircraft target communities, including VAST, FASTGEN, and COVART. Through his leadership, many mutual programs have been undertaken by the JTCG/ME and the JTCG/AS, and the Joint Live Fire (JLF) Program's test results have been successfully integrated into design, modeling, and vulnerability analyses for the tri-service community. Our deepest sympathy to his family and his many friends in the JTCG/ME and JTCG/AS communities.
COL Roy P. "Pat" Oler is the Project Manager, Aviation Electronic Combat, within the Program Executive Office for Aviation, U.S. Army. As such, he is the Army Principal Member on the Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS). Prior to this assignment, he was the Product Manager for the streamlined acquisition of the Army's New Training Helicopter. He has also served as the Chief of Depot Maintenance Operations within the U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command, and commanded AVSCOM's Theater Aviation Maintenance Point in Saudi Arabia during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. COL Oler graduated from Tarleton State University in 1970 at which time he was commissioned a second lieutenant. He received a Master of Science degree from the Florida Institute of Technology and is a 1994 graduate of the U.S. Army War College. A dual-rated Senior Army Aviator, his decorations include the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, and the Army Commendation Medal. He has been inducted into the Army Aviation Association's Honorable Order of St. Michael and is also a recipient of the Secretary of the Army's Award for Outstanding Achievement in Materiel Acquisition. COL Oler can be reached at (314) 263-5527, DSN 693-5527.
A: I am responsible for the life cycle (crib to grave) materiel management of Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) and Aviation Electronics (Avionics), that is, Aviation Electronic Combat, equipment. This includes the timely acquisition of state-of-the-art threat/countermeasures systems (the traditional ASE functions of warning and jamming), as well as the traditional avionics functions of communications, navigation, and identification. Management of the Army's battlefield digitization effort is an umbrella responsibility that spans the entire PM office. I also interface closely with both sides of the acquisition process. On the "crib" side, I must be aware of emerging technologies, and on the "fielded-system" side, I must be aware of how our systems are working in the field, and make system changes, improvements, etc., as required. Additionally, as you know, I serve as the Army principal member on the OSD-sponsored Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability, and the Joint Services Review Committee for Avionics Standardization.
A: Practically all of the 20 plus systems we manage have multiple service involvement. The two I'll focus on here are SIIRCM/CMWS, which stands for the Suite of Integrated Infrared Countermeasures/Common Missile Warning System, and SIRFC, which stands for the Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures.
First, let me talk about SIIRCM/CMWS. SIIRCM is the Army's next generation lamp/laser jammer, coupled with the new missile warner (CMWS), an advanced flare dispenser, and an advanced flare munition. This system replaces the old ALQ-144, M-206, and ALQ-156 families of jammers, flares, and missile warners. The Air Force and Navy are buying the same CMWS that is in SIIRCM, but are integrating it with their existing flare dispenser capabilities.
Secondly, SIRFC is a lightweight, modular system which provides wideband radar warning functions against continuous wave (CW) and pulsed threats; radar jamming against CW, pulsed, Doppler, monopulse, and coherent threats; and lastly, provides the sensor fusion capabilities with SIIRCM, the AVR-2A Laser Detection System, and other on-board systems for better threat correlation.
SIRFC has been selected as the RF system for the CV-22 and looks like it will be integrated into several other platforms that belong to the other services. Because the system is modular and can provide an accurate azimuth to the threat, the radar warning receiver is being investigated to fit into other non-airborne systems. People are just starting to realize the potential of this system.
The end result is better protection for the air crews against both IR and RF missile threats. These threats have proliferated at an alarming rate and technology has increased their capabilities to detect and engage aircraft on the modern battlefield. SIRFC and SIIRCM are vital to ensure the protection of our air crews into the 21st century.
A: By applying funds to study areas of joint mutual interest. One great example has been the SMART effort. For example, simulation will support SIIRCM/CMWS and SIRFC throughout its life cycle in areas such as engineering development, combat development (tactics, techniques, procedures), test and evaluation, training, and exercise support. But to be useful and believable, simulations must be verified, validated, and accredited. The SMART program has defined the process, which is no simple task, so that SIIRCM/CMWS and SIRFC can now use it, and as a result save money and time.
A: Funding stability (or instability) is always a big one. We must work hard at this, because without it, it's tough to make good business decisions that optimize acquisitions as well as spending of the taxpayers' precious dollars. A second major challenge is horizontal technology integration (HTI) How do we field tomorrow's technology today, not the other way around (i.e., yesterday's technology tomorrow)? Thirdly, how do we incorporate nonclassical techniques and technologies (e.g., battlelabs and Army warfighting experiments) into our life-cycle acquisition process?
A: One of the major challenges I foresee is insuring that the accumulated knowledge we have concerning aircraft survivability is not lost. With the downsizing of the agencies that provide survivability expertise, many of the key personnel are leaving. The experience they have accumulated will leave with them, since there is no way to capture it all. Since we will not be building any new airframes in the near future, there is no training ground by which we can educate the newest generation of designers in the lessons we have learned in the past. The possibility exists that when a future platform is designed, ASE designers will have to go through an extensive learning process just to get to the point where we are today.
A: I don't see any major changes to the organization, although I do see a need for a shift in philosophy. Many of the tasks we support don't have a direct connection to a specific program. With the budget restrictions we are facing, we need to create a "legacy" so that future designers have an adequate database when they need to incorporate survivability into their designs.
A: Unfortunately, the survivability war, unlike the Cold War, has not been won. As electronics and electro-optics continue to get better and smaller, radar and missiles get better, smaller, and cheaper, as do the countermeasures against them. Consequently, this creates a power curve that we must stay ahead of so we will not be surprised after the fact. So, I see survivability, radar, and missiles continuing their war of one-upmanship until electronics and electro-optics technologies level out.
A: While our integrated advanced RF and IR countermeasure suites have their own detectors for collecting threat information, they are limited in their area of regard. Improved situational awareness has always been key to improved aircraft survivability. Our avionics and digitization efforts have focused on key enabling programs that include the Aviation Mission Planning (AMPS), POS/NAV (three GPS solutions), and communications technologies (High Frequency, Nap-Of-The-Earth and Have Quick II radios, and the Improved Data Modem).
An important effort now underway is the development of an Aviation "System of Systems" technical architecture (ASOSA) that will outline the path for the intraconnectivity of aircraft systems of the next century. This architecture encompasses all aspects of computers, communication, electronics, and power management and distribution for Army aircraft. On-board ASE systems will not only protect aircrews, but become additional sensors, passing back information to update the commander's picture of the battlefield. The common architecture across all Army systems will improve information transport, and data processing, and will provide soldiers and commanders with complete and timely information at the critical moment.
In a nutshell, our avionics and digitization programs provide enhanced situational awareness information to the aircrews, complementing on-board aircraft survivability equipment, and our advanced ASE systems become sensors providing additional intelligence data for the combined arms team. The development of the aviation technical architecture ensures complete dissemination of information and contributes to the commander's situational awareness of the battlefield and the ability to win the information war.
A: Yes, indeed. In fact, the SIIRCM/CMWS acquisition I just discussed is ours and the Army's first program that addresses streamlining. Two examples of streamlining are (1) the merger of the Army, Navy, and Air Force programs, and (2) the elimination of all military standards and specifications from the SIIRCM/CMWS Request For Proposals. The result has been event-driven, performance-oriented instructions to our contractors, rather than schedule-driven packages. The manifestations of this change in philosophy are already dramatic. For example, the SIIRCM/CMWS Statement of Work was only 99 pages and the total number of data items was 62. Non-streamlined packages typically have SOWs of 200 pages or more, and over 100 data items. Another example is SIRFC, which used a common sense approach to contractor requirements and has been using best commercial practices. Level 3 drawings were not required from the contractor since they add very little value for the money and take time to complete. We took a common sense approach and ensured every requirement contributed to the program objective.
A: First, in the area of HTI, we have been somewhat involved with the Second Generation Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) HTI effort. This is an effort to integrate the latest FLIR technologies, initially among Bradley fighting vehicles, Abrams tanks, and TOW weapon systems, and ultimately to the aviation platforms as well. The need to fully communicate across the digital battlefield places an enormous requirement on an aviation platform. These requirements are not easily met by using existing systems and simply adding them to the platform to obtain the desired capability. Weight, size, and power all must be considered when inserting technology to support battlefield digitization. The concept behind JCIT (Joint Combat Information Terminal), for example, is to increase the capability and functionality of the communication system while decreasing the size, weight, and power of the communication, INFOSEC, and message processing system. JCIT does this by using current commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and government off-the-shelf (GOTS) technologies. Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC), Digital Signal Processors (DSP), and other miniaturization technologies are available today to funnel the separate boxes required to support the various digital communication links and consolidate them into an integrated communication terminal.
Other avionics-related examples of HTI include the addition of an integrated embedded GPS navigation solution of the Force Modernized fleet. For the utility and cargo helicopters, a GPS module is embedded into an existing Doppler navigation system. Integration is such that a single navigation solution is provided to the pilot that can be Doppler only, GPS only, or combined modes of operation. For the Apache, Kiowa Warrior, and Special Operations aircraft, a GPS module is included in an Embedded GPS Inertial (EGI) navigation system. This system provides enhanced, more accurate targeting capability for these aircraft. The GPS receiver-modules also provide precise time synchronization for the SINCGARS and HAVE QUICK radio systems.
On the ASE side of the house, although not formally designated as an HTI effort, SIIRCM/CMWS is, in fact, a large-scale horizontal integration of IRCM technology across 17 different Army, Navy, and Air Force rotary and fixed wing aircraft. Additionally, the Armored Systems Modernization PEO is looking at SIIRCM/CMWS technology for protection against Anti-Tank Guided Munitions (ATGM) since ATGMs also employ infrared seekers. SIRFC, although not a formally designated HTI, is being investigated for nonairborne applications as well.
As for P3I efforts, we are looking at the incorporation of numerous technologies. I see a lot of promise in some RF to optical conversion work. This will reduce the weight of both the A-kit and B-kit and make the integration easier due to fewer electromagnetic problems. It's interesting to note that this technology was developed for the cable TV industry. We have to repackage it for a new environment. I also want to ensure that the system can be expanded. I see the growth of radar to include MMW capabilities, which is a future upgrade for SIRFC.
In the area of P3I for SIIRCM/CMWS, we (Army, Navy, and Air Force) have a massive cooperative effort with the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), Defense Science Office in the area of compact solid state and semiconductor lasers and nonlinear optical materials, as well as a separate P3I effort with the Naval Research Laboratory in the area of high efficiency optical fibers. Both are preplanned product improvements to SIIRCM/SMWS to efficiently generate and transmit more infrared light that will be necessary to deal with the next generation of infrared missile seekers - focal plane arrays. Another requirement in our SIIRCM/CMWS ORD is obstacle avoidance (terrain, wires, etc.). Since the technology does not yet exist to efficiently integrate this capability into our aircraft, it is a P3I just awaiting the maturation of laser radar technology.
Throughout the Department of Defense, lasers have become commonplace in range finders, target designators, laser radar, gyros, and numerous other applications. These low power systems, although not a direct threat in and among themselves, assist in the acquisition, identification, and illumination of targets for various types of munitions. Advanced high power laser systems have also shown their ability to provide a hard kill defense capability, without the need for follow-up munitions. Between the low power laser support subsystems and the high power hardkill laser lies the medium power tactical softkill category. It is in this regime that the Directorate for Applied Technology Test and Simulation (formerly the Nuclear Effects Directorate) has provided the tactical test environment for the Army since 1993.
Located at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in New Mexico, the Pulsed Laser Vulnerability Test System (PLVTS) provides a transportable, closed-cycle, electrically-discharged, pulsed CO2 laser operating at a wavelength of 10.6 microns. The PLVTS can deliver up to 1,000 joules per pulse at a 10 Hz repetition frequency in a dedicated laboratory environment, through a 50 cm telescope to the various down range test areas, or through the 60 cm pointer-tracker for illumination of dynamic targets at extended ranges. The PLVTS supports a full complement of beam diagnostic instrumentation that measures critical output performance parameters of the laser device as well as selected parameters at the target plane.
In addition to the PLVTS, the High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility at WSMR operates the free world's only high energy laser weapon system prototype, the Mid Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL). WSMR also operates the 1.8 m Sea Lite Beam Director (SLBD), the 50 ft diameter Large Vacuum Chamber, a number of low to medium power lasers at various wavelengths, and a battery of sophisticated instrumentation.
For more information on PLVTS, contact Steve Squires or Chris Beairsto at (505) 679-5122, DSN 349-5122.
Picture an aircraft, manned or unmanned, hovering high over hostile territory, virtually impregnable against all conventional air defense threats. Such a capability would surely have a profound effect on the doctrine and tactics of our forces contending with the post-Cold War "new world order." This capability will enable a future Captain Kirk and his Starship Enterprise to "go boldly forth," as long as his engineering officer, Scotty, is able to maintain the strength of the "force field shield." As any "Trekkie" understands, the technology behind this force field is directed energy, the means of near instantaneous (at or near the speed of light) delivery of intense amounts of energy to distant locations.
Directed energy weapons (DEW) technology has been an area of defense research for more than 20 years, with varying intensity levels as budgets and administrations change. In this article, I share my perceptions of how we have furthered our understanding of DEW technologies and, in particular, how close we may be to realizing some of the benefits of the force field shield to enhance the survivability of military aircraft.
Forms of DEW - The three general classes of DEW are lasers, radio frequency (RF), and energetic particle beams. Lasers operate in the optical, infrared (IR), and ultimately ultraviolet (UV) and X-ray radiation bands. On the modern battlefield, lasers were tested during the Gulf War in many applications, particularly as range-finders and target designators. Other applications include laser communication, precision active tracking, and laser detection and ranging (LADAR), but these applications are not generally considered "weapons." I include as weapons those laser systems designed to actively degrade, disrupt, or destroy electro-optical (EO)/IR sensor systems (anti-sensor weapons), whether permanently or only temporarily.
RF weapons include high power microwave (HPM) and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) systems (both nuclear and conventionally driven). The former are typically narrowband (possibly tunable) and the latter are broadband (impulse). Of course, RF countermeasures, jammers, and spoofers date back to World War II and represent a highly developed and sophisticated technology. Such techniques are exploited for aircraft survivability, but are not generally classed as DEWs. Advanced RF weapons are designed to destroy or disrupt analog or digital electronic systems by less subtle means. The third class of DEW, energetic particle beams, offers the potentially most potent form of DEW, in that their penetrating power is robust against even the most stringent hardening measures. These weapons seem most suitable for vacuum (space) applications, where interactions with the atmosphere cannot degrade their propagation over long ranges. Even though directed "lightning bolts" seem an attractive weapon, the problems associated with propagating and guiding electron beams through the air are formidable and unlikely to be overcome in the next few decades. Another form of directed energy sometimes discussed is the gamma-ray laser, or "Grazer." This concept is analogous to the laser, except that it involves stimulated transitions in the nuclear, rather than electronic, energy levels. This concept has not progressed to the point where serious consideration is given to its practicality.
The most highly developed lasers for potential high energy DEW applications are chemically driven, that is, they involve the direct conversion of chemical energy into light. Of these, the hydrogen/deuterium fluoride (HF/DF) and chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL) are by far the most advanced, both having demonstrated over a hundred kW average power with excellent beam quality. Solid state lasers, in which the active lasing elements are embedded in a host matrix and stimulated by external sources such as flash lamps or (more recently) diode lasers, have not reached the average power levels of the chemical devices, but in many ways are more suited to laser countermeasure systems, intended to defeat the sensitive sensors and guidance systems of potential threats.
RF weapons have come a long way over the past decade. Advanced pulse forming networks, converters (to transform electron beams into RF power) and directional antennas are all under active research and development. This area is difficult to discuss in open sources, but the technologies are approaching the point where the application to aircraft survivability can be seriously contemplated. A major consideration is the potential for fratricide or suicide, because U.S. and allied weapons, surveillance, and communication systems involve a high degree of sophisticated electronics that could be susceptible to EM effects. This is a particularly stressing issue where aircraft systems are involved. To return to the Starship Enterprise theme, it would not do for Scotty's force field to knock out the ship's navigation or communication systems (not to mention the "warp drive"). Accordingly, RF weapons intended for aircraft survivability must be highly directional, and extensive testing and analysis would be required to avoid undesirable side effects.
Aircraft Survivability Enhancements - Of the three categories of survivability measures (susceptibility reduction, vulnerability reduction, and battle damage repair), DEW systems are relevant to the first two. Within susceptibility reduction, DEW systems can play a role, first in preventing detection and targeting; next in hit avoidance by deflecting, blinding, or breaking lock of the oncoming missile; and finally, where necessary, physically destroying the missile in flight. An additional approach could be to defeat the fusing system, but this would only be invoked in extremis for obvious reasons. Both self-defense (the shield) and escort defense applications are possible. I discuss each of these applications below.
Both lasers and RF weapons could be used to avoid detection and targeting. In the case of RF weapons, if the location of air defense radars and/or C3I systems can be localized (order of kilometers), the potential exists to suppress those sites using an RF weapon to destroy air defense radars/C3I systems electronics. This capability is not available, but is conceivable given reasonable extrapolation of the technology. Again, care would have to be taken to avoid fratricide effects. Anti-sensor laser weapons could be used to defeat optical detection and targeting systems. The technologies involved are similar to those developed for the Army's "Stingray" anti-sensor system. One or several lasers of different wavelengths would "interrogate" the terrain, detect hostile sensors, and invoke a "weapon" beam tuned to the acceptance band of the sensor to destroy or damage it. A lower power laser could also temporarily jam the sensor (just as in its radar counterpart), but these effects would be transitory. In both the laser and RF cases, precise knowledge of threat location is required to bound the countermeasure technique within practical limits.
When an aircraft has been detected, targeted, locked-on, and the missile fired, the emphasis has to shift to defeating the in-flight missile. Of course, except in the case of autonomously guided missiles, countermeasures against the ground (or hostile aircraft) tracking and command guidance system could still be effective (as in the case of conventional RF countermeasures). We already have a number of countermeasures against RF seekers. The real challenge is posed by the shoulder-launched "fire and forget" type of IR guided missiles. In most cases, such missiles require lock-on prior to launch; they do not have autonomous reacquisition capability. Given an adequate hemispheric missile warning system (such as that in development), it is quite conceivable that the missile can be defeated in flight. One approach is to use an RF weapon (directed from the aircraft under attack, or counter-launched) to defeat the guidance electronics. For optical or IR seekers that are obviously not "in-band" to the RF weapons, a "back-door" means of coupling the RF energy into the attacking missile must be used. We know that such back-door mechanisms exist; however, they are notoriously unpredictable and statistically diverse, differing by orders of magnitude from missile to missile, even those of the same class, depending on the missile's maintenance history.
Another approach is to use a laser to attack the threat in its seeker band. For highly dynamic aircraft that can maneuver to avoid the threat, it may suffice to simply blind the missile and assume it can be avoided. For slower, high-value aircraft (e.g., C-17, AWACS, JSTARS), blinding may not be sufficient; the threat could still glide in close enough to fuse and cause damage. In this case, it is possible to use a "smart" jammer, wherein the oncoming missile is first identified, and then a tailored in-band jamming signal is sent to cause break lock or actual deflection. Both the Naval Research Lab (for ship defense applications) and the Air Force Wright Laboratory are developing multiwavelength laser systems to accomplish this countermeasure. This technology is one step beyond the near-term ATIRCM system in that the laser waveform is tailored to the specific threat and hence will cover a wider class of missile seekers.
The ultimate susceptibility denial technique is provided by a DEW system that can destroy any approaching missile at a safe distance (the Enterprise's force shield). Unless it can be depended on to induce premature fusing (a very problematic capability), an RF weapon is not a likely candidate for a direct destruction system. On the other hand, laser weapon technologies (both chemical and possibly solid state) are reaching the point that, at least for large aircraft that can afford the volume and weight penalty, a self-defense laser weapon may prove to be practical. The Air Force Phillips Laboratory is developing the technology base for an airborne laser weapon system (carried in a 747) that could destroy ballistic missiles in their boost phase from hundreds of miles distance. This system and its laser fuel would occupy the entire aircraft and could not be retrofitted as an add-on piggyback to other aircraft. But there is no need to destroy the oncoming missile hundreds of miles away. The potential definitely exists to design a self-protection laser weapon operating in the multikilowatt (rather than multimegawatt) power level, which could fit in a pod or embedded aircraft system.
Prospects for Near-Term DEW Survivability Enhancements - The significant investment in DEW technologies, both RF and laser, over the past two decades has dramatically improved our understanding of the potential and limitations of such weapons. Although the first DEW system has yet to be fielded (in fact, none are beyond advanced development), it is fair to say that we can now anticipate a number of applications. DEW systems are intrinsically defensive. The problem of reducing the susceptibility of aircraft to air defense weapons, particularly the inexpensive "Stinger" type of shoulder-fired IR seekers, seems to dictate serious consideration of both RF and laser countermeasures. I believe that near-term applications are within grasp and the time has come to develop appropriate system concept designs and technology integration programs based on demonstrated technologies.
In the area of vulnerability reduction, we must be concerned with the possibility that hostile directed energy weapons could some day be employed against our own airborne systems. The United States is not the only advanced country which has been attracted by the potential advantages of speed of light weapons, although it is safe to say that there is no deployed threat at present. The subject of protective measures (laser countermeasures) warrants a separate article, but suffice it to say that a number of techniques (e.g., in-band laser goggles to protect crew eyes and/or aircraft sensors, hardening of aircraft structures against thermal energy or RF effects, polishing of surfaces to reduce laser energy coupling) have been suggested and investigated. Obviously, these same countermeasures could be exploited to mitigate any directed energy weapons we might choose to develop, so any such development must be conducted in the context of potential countermeasures.
Dr. Louis C. Marquet is the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for Advanced Development working in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. He received his B.S. in Physics from Carnegie Tech (now Carnegie-Mellon University) and received his Ph.D. in Physics from the University of California, Berkeley. Dr. Marquet can be reached at (703) 614-8436, DSN 224-8436.
The Air Force Phillips Laboratory in Albuquerque, New Mexico, is the lead DoD agency for directed energy weapons (DEW) research and development. It manages and conducts the nation's largest technology programs for both high-energy lasers (HEL) and high-power microwaves (HPM). Formerly, lab personnel also worked on development of high-energy particle beam weapons. Recently, the potential for HPM weapons has dramatically increased due to major advances in source technology and the increased vulnerability of targets because of widespread use of solid state electronics.
The goals of the Air Force HPM program are to develop and transition weapon technologies and to protect military systems against potential HPM weapon threats. Research and development are ongoing to advance and evaluate wideband and narrowband HPM sources for aircraft self-protection, suppression of enemy air defenses, command and control warfare, counter air, space control, and access denial. This work is complemented with a broad-based survivability program to measure and predict HPM effects on Air Force systems, develop and demonstrate hardening countermeasures, and to transition measurement and hardening technology to product and logistic centers.
High-power microwaves travel at the speed of light, are insensitive to weather, require only course pointing, and can negate target electronics in fractions of a second. Effects on electronics range from disruption to destruction, depending on electromagnetic susceptibility and HPM weapon parameters. The high-power microwave program parameter space covers RF frequencies from tens of MHz to tens of GHz, pulse widths from sub-nanosecond to hundreds of microseconds, pulse repetition rates from single pulse to thousands of Hz, and power levels from megawatts to gigawatts. This vast range of parameters makes measurement and prediction of HPM threat effects far more difficult than those of nuclear electro-magnetic pulse (EMP). The services have worked extensively to develop and validate the best methodology for assessing the susceptibility of systems, subsystems, and components to HPM; develop an effects database; and develop modeling and simulation tools.
Microwaves can couple into system electronics through front door and back door paths at frequencies that may be either in-band or out-of-band. Electronics can be burned out even when the system is turned off. In general, the susceptibility of electronics to HPM increases as the scale size of the electronics decreases, making the most modern electronic systems potentially the most vulnerable. Hardening against HPM threats is possible, but difficult to implement and maintain against a wide range of potential threats. It is clearly most cost effective to harden during initial system development, and often impractical to retro-harden.
The Phillips Laboratory just completed a multiyear program to measure and understand the effects of HPM on an F-16 testbed aircraft and to evaluate possible hardening technologies. A major program objective was to develop a methodology to assess HPM effects on large complicated systems. Electromagnetic coupling to the many critical electronic systems was measured with specially developed diagnostics and instrumentation. Computer simulations guided the experiments and aided understanding of the results. Coupling paths into the aircraft compartments were characterized and effects on electronic boxes were measured in the aircraft and separately in the laboratory. As part of this program, the susceptibility of the low-altitude navigation and targeting IR system for night (LANTIRN) to electromagnetic radiation was measured and hardening countermeasures developed and demonstrated. This hardening technology was transitioned to the LANTIRN System Program Office (SPO) for implementation. The results of this comprehensive assessment of the effects of HPM on a fly-by-wire aircraft have been reported to the F-16 SPO and have also been transferred to other organizations with a need-to-know. The F-16 testbed program helped to develop an understanding of the potential HPM threat to fly-by-wire aircraft and to assess the feasibility of using HPM weapons on board such aircraft.
The Air Force is the lead service for research and development of HPM technology for aircraft self-protection. HPM can potentially provide a robust countermeasure to the full spectrum of missile threats. It could defeat missiles by disrupting or destroying the electronics in the seeker, guidance, and possibly the fuze, with little or no knowledge of missile details. The Air Force is working to develop and demonstrate a high-power ultra-wide bandwidth (UWB) system for protection of aircraft against missile threats. The effects of UWB radiation on aircraft and threat missiles are being measured and modeled. In the late 1990s, the Air Force plans to demonstrate the technical feasibility of using HPM for aircraft self-protection.
High-power microwave weapons provide both a potential future threat to aircraft and a possible means of countering conventional threats. In the future, HPM weapons applications to the battlefield for multiple purposes may place aircraft inadvertently at risk through increased electromagnetic interference. Research and development over the next several years should better define hardening requirements and weapon feasibility.
Dr. William Baker is the Technical Director for High Power Microwaves, Advanced Weapons and Survivability Directorate, AF Phillips Laboratory. He holds B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. degrees in Physics from Ohio State University. Dr. Baker can be reached at (505) 846-4040, DSN 246-4040.
The Low Energy Laser Weapon Simulation (LELAWS) is an engineering simulation model originally developed by the United States Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) in the early 1980s in support of the Forward Area Directed Energy Weapon study. LELAWS is used primarily to evaluate the item-level performance of low-energy laser systems in the anti-sensor role. In addition, the model can be used in laser hazard/safety studies to estimate the level of laser eye hazards associated with low-energy lasers on the battlefield or during training exercises. LELAWS has been used extensively throughout defense agencies and private industry, and has been accepted as the standard within the laser community.
LELAWS models the propagation of pulse or continuous wave energy from a low-energy laser weapon, laser range finder, or laser target designator through a turbulent atmosphere to an optical or electro-optical target on a land- or air-based target platform. The primary measure of effectiveness generated by LELAWS is the probability that a single pulse (or train of pulses) reaching the target sensor will exceed the damage threshold of the sensor. LELAWS is configured to run interactively on an IBM personal computer and on a VAX mainframe running UNIX.
As shown in Figure 1, the LELAWS menu allows the user to input 36 variables that describe the systems and scenario of interest. Laser system characteristics include laser wavelength, output energy, and beam divergence. Target characteristics depend on the type of optical or electro-optical system being studied. The user chooses from hazards to unaided eyes, eyes looking through a vision block, eyes looking through magnifying optics, and electro-optical devices, such as TVs, image intensifiers, forward looking infrared (FLIR). The user must then input the various relevant parameters and the damage levels for electro-optical devices. In the case of hazard to personnel, the user has a number of options to choose from in defining the damage level of interest. Four damage levels can be chosen that will evaluate the probability of personnel losing fine or gross visual acuity for either a short (approximately 30 seconds) or long (greater than several hours) duration of time. The Walter Reed Army Medical Detachment at Brooks Air Force Base developed these definitions of damage and effect to reflect the military significance of laser injuries. In addition, the user can choose a multiple of ED50, or can input the actual damage threshold energy of interest. LELAWS models all visible wavelengths, near infrared and far infrared.
Figure 1. Classes of LELAWS Inputs
As Figure 2 shows, in between the laser and the target, the user must input a number of parameters to define atmospheric conditions through which the laser energy will propagate. These include atmospheric visibility and optical turbulence. LELAWS can also model the effects of certain countermeasures, such as optical filters and smoke deployed on the battlefield. LELAWS also accounts for the engagement geometry between the laser and target.
Figure 2. The Low Energy Laser Engagement
Early model validation consisted of comparing the output of certain LELAWS algorithms with available data. During the late 1980s, AMSAA was able to design tests for developmental Army laser systems that also provided data that could be compared directly to the LELAWS model. This analysis led to modification of certain atmospheric routines so that the model's results closely matched actual test data. The Army fully accredited LELAWS in 1992.
Dean C. Muscietta is an electrical engineer for the U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity. He holds a B.E. from the Stevens Institute of Technology. Mr. Muscietta can be reached at (410) 278-5015, DSN 298-5015.
Military aircraft face threats ranging from small arms fire to sophisticated guided missiles. Unfortunately, the range of threats to aircraft has now broadened to include directed energy weapons (DEW). DEWs fall within the electronic warfare category as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Memorandum of Policy No. 6. The three basic types of DEWs are laser, radio frequency (RF), and particle beam weapons. This article focuses on RF DEWs, also known as high power microwave (HPM) weapons, and an RF DEW engagement model known as the Directed RF Energy Assessment Model (DREAM). DREAM is being developed by a tri-service team consisting of the Army Research Laboratory, the Air Force's Phillips Laboratory, the Naval Air Warfare Center, and the team's contractors SPARTA Inc. and Ball Aerospace Corporation, under the sponsorship of the JTCG/AS and the services.
An RF DEW uses a beam of high-power RF pulses, similar to a radar, to irradiate a target and couple sufficient energy into the target's electronics to cause temporary interference/upset or permanent damage. RF DEWs are generally nonlethal to humans (compared with projectiles), affecting only the target's electronics. RF DEWs, however, could present a greater threat than conventional weapons due to the following characteristics:
The primary limitation of an RF DEW is the uncertainty in the probability of kill given a hit, because the kill depends greatly on the weapon parameters and its target. Therefore, although an RF DEW could pose a threat to aircraft, the critical questions are what RF power density is required to affect the target (i.e., the aircraft vulnerability level) and how close the weapon must be to be effective.
To help answer these questions, DREAM was developed to simulate an RF DEW engagement with an aircraft/missile and to compute the probability of failure of the target as a function of the incident RF power density and weapon range. DREAM runs on an MS-DOS compatible personal computer under the Microsoft Windows environment. The model provides a graphical user interface to facilitate the input of parameters describing the RF DEW, the environment/propagation conditions, the target flight path, and a target description in a fault tree form. DREAM is based on the DoD HPM assessment methodology developed by the RF Effects Technical Working Group of the Joint Directors of Laboratories Technology Panel on DEW.
The probability of failure curves produced by DREAM can be used in the development of RF protection or "hardening" requirements for aircraft or as inputs for higher level force-on-force battlefield simulations evaluating the impact of RF DEWs on aircraft sortie generation. Though still under development, an initial version (Version 0) of DREAM is now available for limited distribution.
John Tatum is an electronic systems engineer with the Army Research Laboratory (ARL) in Adelphi, Maryland. He is presently a project leader in the RF Effects and Hardening Technology Branch. Mr. Tatum is the current chairman of the RF Effects Technical Working Group of the Joint Directors of Laboratories Technology Panel on DEW, as well as a co-chairman of the Advanced Threats Committee of the JTCG/AS Methodology Subgroup. He holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the University of Maryland and has completed graduate studies in the areas of radar and communications. Mr. Tatum can be reached at (301) 394-3012, DSN 290-3012.
SURVIAC has added a home page to the World-Wide Web (WWW) where users can find out what services SURVIAC provides, and sample some of SURVIAC's products. SURVIAC's home page enables access to the SURVIAC Bulletin, the SURVIAC calendar of events, a list of SURVIAC products, and the JTCG/AS' Aircraft Survivability. The SURVIAC home page can be accessed by entering its URL (Universal Resource Locator):
http://surviac.flight.wpafb.af.mil
SURVIAC continually updates the information available at this web site.
A charged particle beam (CPB) is a directed energy weapon concept with great potential. A charged particle beam weapon system is composed of an accelerator whose output is coupled to a beam director, which projects an intense, energetic electron beam to a target at very nearly the speed of light. Upon striking the target, the electrons pass through its skin, depositing their energy internally. This penetration is the key element to the lethality of a CPB weapon: when a CPB strikes a missile or aircraft target, significant damage results. Even when the beam does not directly strike the target, the ionizing radiation generated by passage through the atmosphere has been demonstrated to cause transient upset in essential electronic components.
The endoatmospheric CPB effort has focused on developing methods to deliver energy to a target over ranges of military significance. Originally, endoatmospheric CPB research was primarily of interest to the Navy as a candidate tech- nology for anti-ship missile defense (ASMD). The principal advantages of using charged particle beams for ASMD include near speed-of-light engagement, instantaneous catastrophic kill capability, near infinite magazine capacity, reduced requirement for storage of energetic materials, and insensitivity of the beam to weather conditions. The robust beam parameters make shielding impractical. Reduction of the engagement time greatly improves the engagement rates possible; this is increasingly important as the attacking missiles become more agile, faster, and stealthier, thereby reducing defense reaction times. For ASMD, propagation requirements drive the beam parameters; available data indicate that a beam with sufficient energy fluence to propagate will also cause detonation of the high explosive used in missile warheads.
Charged particle beam technology is still developmental. The primary emphasis of research has been on the design of compact, lightweight accelerators and propagation of the beam through the atmosphere. Ancillary issues such as beam-target interaction, beam steering, and beam-produced radiation effects have also been investigated to a lesser extent.
For long-range propagation within the atmosphere, the beam is broken into short pulses. The first pulse heats the air through which it passes. The heated air expands, creating a reduced density channel through which the next pulse passes with few losses. The second pulse then extends this channel for subsequent pulses. This "holeboring" process is continued until the last pulse deposits lethal energy deeply within the target. To date, stable propagation of a single pulse has been demonstrated, but multipulse propagation requires advances in the accelerator technology. For applications that do not require propagation beyond several hundred meters, single pulses of less energetic electrons can be used.
Accelerators capable of delivering both high current and high particle energy are required for application of this technology. To reduce the overall size of the accelerator to be of military interest, the beam is recirculated many times through the accelerating cells. A proof-of-concept experiment (illustrated in Figure 1) is scheduled for completion in 1996.
Figure 1. The Spiral Line Induction Accelerator Proof-of-Concept Experiment Demonstration of Compact Accelerator Technology
If accelerator size and weight can be reduced sufficiently as the technology matures, other applications can be considered. Short-range air defense and tactical missile defense from Army mobile platforms would be a natural extension of the ASMD mission. Because the propagation range scales approximately as the mass of air through which the beam must travel, high-altitude propagation is extended and airborne applications may be attractive if a dedicated aircraft were acceptable. Aircraft self-protection applications are even more challenging in terms of the accelerator size and weight necessary to deliver the technology.
Dr. Joel Miller is the Particle Beam Subpanel Chairman of the Joint Directors of Laboratories Technology Panel on Directed Energy Weapons. He holds a B.Eng. in Electrical Engineering and a M.Eng. in Engineering Physics from McMaster University, and a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Michigan. He can be reached at (301) 394-1878, DSN 290-1878.
Dr. Eugene Nolting is a senior scientist at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, in Silver Spring, MD. He holds a B.A. in Physics and Mathematics from the University of Northern Iowa, and an M.S. and a Ph.D. in Physics from the University of Miami. He can be reached at (301) 394-2418, DSN 290-2418.
Dr. Nancy Chesser is Vice President for Technology Analysis at Directed Technologies, Inc. She holds a B.A. in Physics from Cornell University and a Ph.D. in Physics from the State University of New York at Stonybrook. She can be reached at (703) 243-3383.
A new report by a National Research Council committee suggests that Congress should waive full-up, full-scale live fire tests required by law for the F-22, the Air Force's newest combat aircraft, because the tests are impractical and offer limited benefits for the costs incurred. The committee recommended that instead, more tests be added to the Air Force's alternative F-22 live fire test program.
If carried out, full-up, full-scale tests would subject the F-22 to live fire in its combat configuration, which would include testing a fully built aircraft with on-board weapons and fuel in place. During the test, munitions likely to be encountered by the F-22 in combat would be fired at the aircraft in a simulated environment. The Air Force estimates that those tests would cost approximately $250 million. The Air Force has planned an alternative live fire testing program, which would include tests of F-22 components and subsystems, as well as different configurations of partially assembled aircraft, at a cost of about $38 million.
The F-22 was designed for the air-to-air portion of a counter-air mission. Thus, the committee restricted its analysis to the type of live fire tests applicable to that type of aircraft use. Should other missions be authorized - particularly ground attack - the law requires that a new vulnerability analysis be performed, which might change the types of live fire tests needed. For the counter-air mission, however, advanced technologies, including stealth, should enable the F-22 to penetrate deeply into hostile airspace and shoot down threatening aircraft before being detected. If detected, the aircraft has the speed, maneuverability, and other capabilities that should minimize the likelihood of its being hit.
If full-up, full-scale tests were waived, the law permits the Secretary of Defense to substitute live fire tests of components, subsystems, and partially assembled aircraft, together with design analyses, modeling and simulation data, and analysis of combat data. With any waiver, the Secretary of Defense must report how system survivability will be evaluated and assess possible alternatives.
The committee evaluated the current vulnerability assessment program that the Air Force has proposed as an alternative to full-up, full-scale tests of the F-22. It found that the Air Force and its contractors had incorporated many features in the aircraft's design that would reduce its vulnerability. The committee concluded that the design was complemented by a strong vulnerability analysis and live fire test program.
However, the committee did express some concerns about the program and made several recommendations. Many of those recommendations directly affect the JTCG/AS and its role and possible funding:
Several other committee recommendations would influence other key areas of survivability analysis and testing, and this would likely involve JTCG/AS participation (i.e., update of survivability references and composite material ballistic effects).
The National Research Council, which formed the committee that examined the testing program, is the principal operating agency of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering. It is a private, nonprofit institution that provides science and technology advice under a congressional charter.
Congress requested the committee's analysis and the U.S. Department of Defense sponsored the effort. Copies of the full report are available for sale:
National Academy Press
P. O. Box 285
2101 Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20055
1-800-624-6242
Kevin Crosthwaite is the director of the Survivability/Vulnerability Information Analysis Center (SURVIAC). Mr. Crosthwaite holds a B.S. in Engineering Physics and an M.S. in Nuclear Physics from Ohio State University. He may be reached at (513) 255-4840, DSN 785-4840.
The Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS) recently held its 1995 symposium, Challenges in Air Combat Survivability: The Next 25 Years. Conceived and directed by Dale Atkinson (Symposium Chairman) and LTC John Lawless (Director, JTCG/AS Central Office), the symposium examined the latest scientific advancements in the aircraft survivability arena and expected future developments. The forum provided information geared towards the technical expert, as well as the manager responsible for resource allocation, budgeting, marketing, etc.
The symposium incorporated seven sessions: (I) the Introduction; (II) Susceptibility Reduction; (III) Vulnerability Reduction; (IV) Survivability Methodology; (V) Joint Live Fire and Battle Damage Repair; (VI) The Next 25 Years; and (VII) Systems Survivability. Session I featured Dr. George Schneiter (Director of Strategic and Tactical Systems, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense), who addressed JTCG/AS contributions since 1971 and the organization's focus for the next 25 years. Session I also included presentations from representatives of the Army, Navy, and Air Force (Tom House, VADM William Bowes, and Lt Gen Richard Scofield, respectively) and articulated the varying service viewpoints on aircraft survivability.
Session II, chaired by Bill Nicholson (Chief, Technical Management Division of the Army's Aviation Electronic Combat Program Office) consisted of presentations covering low observables, smart munitions, foreign EO systems, and imaging missile countermeasures. Session II also highlighted products derived from susceptibility research such as radar and laser warning receivers, flares, and laser decoys. Session III, chaired by Lt Col Norman Johnson, USAF, OUSD (A&T), Test, Systems Engineering and Evaluation Directorate), investigated fuel systems, vulnerability reduction in the F/A-18E/F aircraft, and commercial aircraft payoffs. Smart design practices, jam resistant actuators, and hydraulic sensing systems are but a few of the technology advances resulting from the vulnerability reduction field. The SMART Project, RADGUNS, FACTR, AJEM, and DIME were the topics of discussion in Session IV, chaired by Jerry Wallick (Research Fellow in the Advanced Systems and Resource Analysis Group).
A UH-60 Black Hawk was flown in for static display courtesy of the U.S. Army Operational Support Airlift Command, Davison Army Airfield, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
Session V, chaired by Tom Julian (Operational Test & Evaluation Directorate, OSD), discussed joint live fire, aircraft weapons bay vulnerability, and the B-2 and V-22 battle damage repair programs. Additionally, this session emphasized the survivability improvements stemming from the joint live fire evaluations of the F-15, F-16, AV-8, and UH-60. Session VI was a panel discussion directed by RADM Robert Gormley, USN (Ret.), and featured Lee Frame, BGen Robert Magnus, USMC, Frank Kendall, Bartley Osborne, Jr., and John Porter. The panel discussed the challenges facing the air combat survivability community in the near- and long-term.
Dale B. Atkinson, Symposium Chairman, and LTC John N. Lawless, Jr., USA, JTCG/AS Director, examine the cockpit of the UH-60 Black Hawk
Session VII, chaired by Dr. Albert Rainis, Staff Specialist for Survivability, OUSD (A&T), depicted the survivability programs of several aircraft including the V-22, F-22, RAH-66, F/A-18 E/F, and C-17. Specific technologies developed due to the emphasis of survivability features include the AN/APG-73 radar, the ALR-67 radar warning system, and the ALE-50 towed decoy.
During the symposium, more than 40 speakers, panel members, and exhibitors presented a variety of technical aspects, program overviews, and displays to nearly 300 members of the survivability community. The JTCG/AS concluded that the symposium was an efficient and important method of information distribution. As a consequence, planning is under way for the next JTCG/AS Air Combat Survivability Symposium. For further information, contact the JTCG/AS Central Office at (703) 325-0165.
CHALLENGES IN AIR COMBAT SURVIVABILITY: THE NEXT 25 YEARS
June 13-15, 1995
Kossiakoff Center
Applied Physics Laboratory
The Johns Hopkins University
Laurel, Maryland
George R. Schneiter, Director of Strategic and Tactical Systems, OUSD(A&T), delivers the keynote address
Thomas L. House, Executive Director of the Aviation Research, Development and Engineering Center, U.S. Army Aviation and Troop Command
VADM William C. Bowes, USN, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition)
Lt Gen Richard M. Scofield, USAF, Commander of the Aeronautical Systems Center, receives a JTCG/AS plaque from Symposium Chairman Dale B. Atkinson
D. W. "Skip" Ringo, Manager of Aircraft Engines and Legislative Affairs for the General Electric Company
David P. Hornick, Survivability Division Director for the Naval Air Systems Command and JTCG/AS Chairman
The Kossiakoff Center at The Johns Hopkins University's Applied Physics Laboratory
R. A. "Tim" Horton, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, presents an overview of the Vulnerability Reduction Session
D. Jerry Wallick of LMI, Inc. introduced the session on Survivability Methodology
RADM Robert H. Gormley, USN (Ret), led a panel discussion on "The Next 25 Years." The panel (below) featured Lee Frame, Deputy Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (Conventional Systems), OSD; Frank Kendall, Vice President-Engineering, Raytheon Company and Former Director of Tactical Warfare Programs, OUSD(A&T); BGEN Robert Magnus, USMC, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation (Aviation Plans), Headquarters, Marine Corps; Bartley P. Osborne, Jr., Vice President-Engineering, Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company; and John M. "Rusty" Porter, President, Association of Old Crows and Former Deputy Director of Electronic Warfare, OUSD(A&T)
At the reception on the opening day of the symposium, attendees had an opportunity to view the exhibits, establish new contacts, and renew old acquaintances
Dr. Robert E. Ball, Distinguished Professor,
Naval Postgraduate School
Ralph W. Lauzze II, Joint Test Director for the Joint Live Fire Program and JTCG/AS Air Force Principal Member, and Lawrence A. Eusanio, Institute for Defense Analysis
Jeffrey W. Hess, The Core Group, and Dale B. Atkinson, Symposium Chairman
Dr. Donald L. Ockerman, Institute for Defense Analysis, and Timothy A. Wise, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division
The results of recent experiments and testing in the Fly-By-Light (FBL) technology area indicate applications of this technology can improve flight control survivability. The much publicized electromagnetic immunity usually takes the forefront in survivability discussions. There are, however, two other contributory characteristics that can be attributed to fiber optics: 1) optical bussing does not require a ground path, and 2) optical fiber is physically very small compared with its electrical equivalent. Without a ground path, the signal medium is the only survivability concern, reducing the vulnerable components by 50 percent. The small physical size makes an optical bus less likely to be hit, reducing the kill probability for the system. Overall, an optical network can be more survivable than its electrical equivalent.
Obstacles, however, must be overcome before this technology area is fully exploited. The problems relate to the inherent characteristics of glass: it is fragile, has a low melting point, and has a tendency to fracture when subjected to a shock impulse. These fractures can induce signal losses that can greatly reduce or even eliminate reliable bus communication. Likewise, momentary exposure to melting point temperatures can deform optical fiber, causing disabling signal losses.
The Fiber Optic Control System Vulnerability Reduction (FOCSVR) program is developing potential solutions for these fiber optic weaknesses. FOCSVR is a joint Wright Laboratory and JTCG/AS program, the objective of which is to improve the survivability of fiber optic systems by integration with structural elements to provide increased protection. The program coordinates the in-house expertise and facilities of Wright Laboratory with research performed under a Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) contract.
Performed and fabricated in-house, the structural integration concepts were designed by Lt Kevin Gibbons of the Wright Laboratory's Structures Division. The conceptual idea involves embedding Kevlar conduits in graphite composite structure-stiffening elements. Optical fiber, without its protective cabling, is then installed in the conduits. The four types of stiffening elements are syntactic foam sandwich layering, a blade or "T" stiffener, a foam-filled hat stiffener, and a graphite rod reinforced hat stiffener.
Phase one of FOCSVR involved small-scale testing. Using 16-inch by 16-inch panels, the concepts were evaluated ballis-tically against the 23 mm API to determine the degree of structural damage interaction and/or protection. As expected, direct hits were required to destroy the fiber. There were cases of shots "nudging" the fiber, which resulted in only a momentary disruption of operation. An evaluation of fire protection is also planned.
To support the FOCSVR program, Fiber and Sensor Technologies, Inc. (F&S) of Blacksburg, Virginia, is developing, under SBIR contract, advanced cable designs and instrumentation that will improve survivability of optical busses. Under the Survivability Enhancement of Optical Fiber Data Busses by Structural Integration contract, F&S has developed a highly survivable pultruded composite cable design that has a very high toughness, resists impact damage due to ballistic and tool-dropping impacts, is lightweight (7.0 by 10-3 lb/ft) and can withstand a maximum pull tension force of 400 pounds. Testing has shown that the cable assembly transfers only 7 percent of external tensile strain to optical fibers within, which results in a 5,000 percent increase in the anticipated fiber lifetime.
F&S has also developed an Optical Time Domain Reflectometer-based cable harness diagnostic system that can remotely locate overstrained sections along in-service data busses. The system precisely measures the lengths of individual sections of a cable harness by timing the reflections from the air gaps in the optical connectors. Because the exact lengths can be determined, the overstrained optical cables can be identified by a change in length and then easily replaced during scheduled maintenance.
The last phase of the FOCSVR program involves the fabrication and testing of a larger piece of structure, in this case, a wingbox. The fabrication stage will reveal some of the manufacturing sensitivities of adding the conduits and installing redundant fibers within the wingbox design. The ballistic testing will involve a more comprehensive evaluation against the 23 mm HEI, including hydraulic ram effects and fire. The wingbox testing is scheduled to be performed in mid-October.
Ray Bortner has worked in the Flight Control Division of the Flight Dynamics Directorate, Wright Laboratory for the last 15 years. Currently, he is the program manager for the FOCSVR program and the task leader for flight control of the Fly-by-Light Advanced System Hardware (FLASH) program, an ARPA Technology Reinvestment Program sponsored project. Mr. Bortner holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the University of Akron. He can be reached at (513) 255-8292, DSN 758-8292
Steve Poland serves as the principal investigator at Fiber and Sensor Technologies, Inc. in Blacksburg, VA, for the Phase II SBIR Survivability Enhancement of Optical Fiber Data Busses by Structural Integration. Mr. Poland earned B.S. and M.S. degrees in Electrical Engineering from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. He can be reached at (540) 552-5128.
This past August, the JTCG/AS held a 3-day strategic planning workshop in Warrenton, Virginia. The conference, which was facilitated by Roy Gulick & Company, was designed to assist the JTCG/AS in allocating its FY96 resources and in planning for future years' programs.
Front row (l to r): Tony Lizza, WL; David Hall, NAWCWPNS; Maj Dick Lockwood, USAF, JTCG/AS; Larry De Cosimo, Night Vision; Ray Flores, JTCG/AS; Frank Barone, NRL; Joe Jolley, JTCG/AS. Middle row: LTC John Lawless, USA, JTCG/AS Director; Martin Lentz, Wright Labs (WL); Ralph Lauzze, WL; Gene Birocco, AATD; Rick Hunzicker, WL; Dale Atkinson, Survivability Consultant; David Hornick, NAVAIR; Phil Weinberg, JTCG/AS. Back row: RADM Bob Gormley, USN (Ret), Oceanus Co.; Tim Horton, NAWCWPNS; Roy and Leslie Gulick, Roy Gulick & Co.; Lt Col Norman Johnson, USAF, OUSD; Dick Ledesma, OUSD; LCDR David Hattery, USN, JTCG/AS. Missing: COL Pat Oler, USA, PM AEC. (Photo Courtesy of Jim Buckner, ASI)
The Enhanced Surface-to-Air Missile Simulation (ESAMS) Users Meeting and Configuration Control Board (CCB) meetings were held at Veda, Inc., Dayton, Ohio, in July 1995. The meeting was jointly hosted by Steve Friedman of Veda and Geri Bowling of SURVIAC. Maj Greg "Gumby" Nowell, AFSAA/SAG is the ESAMS model manager and chairs the CCB and the users group. These meetings are arranged and run by Linda Hamilton, SURVIAC, Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc. The ESAMS photographer is Joe Wieczorek, Northrop Grumman.
The next ESAMS mini-workshop, users, and CCB meetings will be in January 1996. The meetings will be hosted by Linda Hamilton and will be held at Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc., Tampa, Florida. The next CCB meeting will be held on January 15, 18, and 19. The mini-workshop will be held on January 16. The users meeting will be held on January 17 and 18. To obtain more information about the meetings, contact Geri Bowling at SURVIAC (513) 255-4840 or DSN 785-4840.
Information for inclusion in the Calendar of Events may be sent to:
SURVIACEvent: AAAA Aviation Electronic Combat (AEC) Symposium
Date: 30 Oct-1 Nov 95
Location: Louisville, KY
POC: Bill Harris, (203) 226-8184
Event: Airborne Interceptor Radar Detection and Evaluation (AIRADE) Introductory Workshop
Date: 5-6 Dec 95
Location: WPAFB, OH
POC: Denny Detamore, (513) 429-9509
Event: ITEA Modeling & Simulation Workshop
Date: 11-14 Dec 95
Location: Las Cruces, NM
POC: ITEA, (703) 631-6220
Aircraft Survivability is available to Government and industry personnel as a means of enabling a meaningful, unclassified technical exchange with their counterparts and other interested individuals in the aeronautical systems development community. The continued effectiveness of this publication, however, lies entirely in the hands of this same group. We depend on our readers for the valuable articles and announcements that make this a viable journal. Without your contributions it is impossible to assemble a coherent, worthwhile publication.
Aircraft Survivability provides contributors an opportunity to gain additional exposure for both their organizations and themselves as recognized experts in this rapidly growing community. Articles should not be more than 500 words long and should provide the reader an unclassified insight on the gains made toward survivability enhancement of aeronautical systems. Photos and camera-ready art submitted with the articles make an even more dynamic publication and are encouraged. However, please limit the number of photos and illustrations to no more than two per article. Government materials should be released for unlimited distribution. Announcements of meetings, symposia or publications are also valuable when they serve the best interest of the survivability community and are suitable for government publication. Materials may be submitted to the editor at the following address:
LTC John N. Lawless, Jr.
Naval Air Systems Command
Code AIR-4.1.8 (JTCG/AS)
1421 Jefferson Davis Highway
Arlington, VA 22243-5120
